RECENT CASES
But if placing the prior mortgagee in possession does not afford adequate protection
to the junior mortgagee, the remedy does not lie in establishing a very questionable
distinction between the senior mortgagee's right to possession before and after appointment of a receiver, but by holding the mortgagee in possession to a more strict standard. Under such a standard the mortgagee in possession would be held accountable for
the proceeds that reasonably efficient management would have availed. See Jackson v.
Lynch, 129 Ill. 72, 21 N.E. 580 (i889); Atwood v. Warner, 92 Neb. 370, 138 N.W. 605
(1912); White v. City of London Brewing Co., 42 Ch. 237 (1889). And where the senior
mortgagee has the unquestioned legal right to possession, as he had in the present case,
it would seem contrary to equitable principles to permit the receiver to force the mortgagee to sue at law in ejectment when the sole result would be to delay the termination
of the receivership.
Real Property-Inheritance Tax-Escheat-[Nebraska].-Upon the death of
O'Connor, intestate and without heirs, the state took his property by escheat. Adams
County brought an action against the state claiming an inheritance tax under a
statute (Neb. Rev. Stat. (1903), § 6622) which named the counties as recipients of
the tax. Held, the county could not recover because escheat is not a transfer of property
"by will or under the intestate laws." In reO'Connor'sEstate, 126 Neb. 182, 252 N.W.
826 (1934).
Under the English common law escheat was an inseparable incident of feudal tenure. The feudal policy was to have a tenant always seized of the land to perform the
feudal services; upon failure of heirs or the inheritable quality of the blood, the estate
of the tenant ended and the lord of the fee, whether a mesne lord or the crown, became
entitled to the land by virtue of his paramount title, that is, the land escheated.
3 Cruise, Digest (1804), 491; 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1923), 67. Those
property rights not the subject of tenure, such as equitable estates, could not escheat.
Burgess v. Wheate, i Eden 177 (1759). Intestate personalty on failure of next kin went
to the crown as bona vacantiaby virtue of the sovereign powers of the crown. Dyke v.
Wiford, 5 Mos. P.C. 434 (1846); In re Bond, [i9o] i Ch. i5. The Statute of Quia
Emptores (129o) made escheat of little value to anyone except the crown. Escheat
has now been abolished in England and intestate land on failure of heirs now lapses to
the Crown as bona vacantia. Administration of Estates Act, 15 Geo. V, c. 3, H9 45(1),
46 (1925).
In the United States the view has been taken that after the Revolution the state
succeeded to the rights of the Crown in the tenure relation; hence, under Quia Emptores, land was held of the state and so escheated to the state upon intestacy and failure
of heirs. Escheat statutes, according to this theory, have merely applied this to all
property, real and personal. State v. Reeder, 5 Neb. 203 (1876); Hughes v. State, 41 Tex.
1o (1874); Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3 d ed. 1915), §§ 23, 24.
Modem writers tend to ignore the feudal origin of escheat and base it upon principles of sovereignty. 3 Kent, Commentaries (14 th ed., 1896), 51o; 4 Kent, Commentaries (I 4 th ed. 1896), 425; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3 d ed. 19o5), 990; 3
Washburne, Real Property (3d ed. 1868), 46-49; 8 Corn. L. Q. 74 (1923); i8 Michigan
L. Rev. 226 (1920). But see Bigelow and Madden, Introduction to the Law of Real
Property (2d ed. 1934), i7. That this attitude is a reflection of the actual state of the
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law is shown in constitutional and statutory provisions abolishing tenure but preserving escheat, (Minn. Const., Art. I, I; Mason's Minn. Stat. (1927) 8720; New York
Const., Art. I, io, ii; Johnston v. Spicer, 107 N.Y. 185, 33 N.E. 753 (1887); Matter of
Melrose Ave., 234 N.Y. 48, 136 N.E. 235 (1922)), and in judicial conclusion where the
statutes are silent on tenure. State v. Ames, 23 La. An. 69 (1871); Matthews v. Ward, lo
Gill & J. (Md.) 443 (1839). To put escheat upon grounds of sovereignty makes it indistinguishable from the doctrine of bona vacantianow in force in England, which vests
intestate property in the crown for the public benefit. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities
(3 d ed. 1915) § 205; 52 Sol. J. 678 (19o8).
Some courts, throwing aside the feudal background of tenure, have felt obliged to
discard the reversion analogy as well, and have held that the state took by succession
as ultimate heir. Christiansonv. King County, 239 U.S. 356 (1915); Note, 15 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 379 (19o8); 3 Minn. L. Rev. 325 (1919); 7 Minn. L. Rev. 168 (1922). Logically,
if this is true, escheated property is subject to an inheritance tax. People v. Richardson,
259 Ill. 275, 1O9 N.E. 1033 (1915); 29 Harv. L. Rev. 455 (1915). But it seems more
accurate to say that the state takes because of failure of heirs. In re Miner'sEstate, 143
o
Cal. 194, 76 Pac. 969 (19o4); Delaney v. State, 42 N.D. 63 , 174 N.W. 290 (1919);
In re McClellan's Estate, 27 S.D. 109, 129 N.W. 1037 (I911); 27 Harv. L. Rev. 452
(1907). Since the court in the principal case considered that a tenure relation existed
between the state and owners of land it would dearly follow that the state was not
taking by transfer by will or by the intestate laws as required by the inheritance
statute (Neb. Rev. Stat. (1913) § 6622), but rather by virtue of its paramount title.
See in re Pell's Estate, 171 N.Y. 48, 63 N.E. 789 (1932); Attorney General v. Mercer,
8 A.C. 767, 772 (1883). Likewise, when the state takes property as bona vacantia, it
takes "by virtue of a paramount title and not by way of representation to the last
owner." Scott, Escheat and Bona Vacantia, 37 Can. L. T. (1917); 52 Sol. J. 678
(i9o8).
Sales-Action for Price of Corporate Shares-[New York].-The defendant agreed
to purchase preferred stock from the plaintiff, title to pass on delivery. The defendant
refused to accept the tendered stock and the plaintiff sued to recover the contract price
of the stock. Held, plaintiff may recover not the contract price but only damages for
the breach. Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 19o N.E. 479 (r934).
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, the common law of New York permitted the seller, in an executory contract for the sale of personal property to recover
the full price. Dustanv. McAndrew, 44 N.Y. 72 (1870); Ackerman v. Rubens, 167 N.Y.
405, 6o N.E. 750 (i9oi); see also Osgoodv. Skinner, 211 Ill. 229, 71 N.E. 869 (i9o4). The
preferable common law view permitted the recovery of the price only when the subject
matter had little or no resale value. Fisher etc. Machine Co. v. Warner, 233 Fed. 527
(C.C.A. 2d 1916); Burdick, Sales (3d ed. x913) § 363; 2 Mechem, Sales (i9oi), § 1694;
8 565, 566.
2 Williston, Sales (1924)
The Uniform Sales Act (§§ 63(3), 64 (i) ), adopted in New York, permits the price
to be recovered only if the "goods" cannot be readily resold for a reasonable price.
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law (1911), §§ 144, 145. "Goods" as defined in the Sales Act (§76)
excludes "things in action and money." N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law (1g1), § 156. Hence
only if shares of stock be "goods" could the Sales Act apply. They have been so considered for various purposes: Statute of Frauds, De Nunzio v. De Nunzio, go Conn.

